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FACT-FINDING AND THE DEATH PENALTY: THE SCOPE OF
A CAPITAL DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL
Welsh S. White*
I. Introduction
The Ninth Circuit's decision invalidating the sentencing provision of
the Arizona death penalty statute in Adamson v. Ricketts' raises an im-
portant question pertaining to the scope of the defendant's sixth amend-
ment right to jury trial. The Arizona statute provides that the judge will
sentence a defendant convicted of first degree murder to death if, but
only if, she finds, first, that one or more statutorily specified aggravating
circumstances are present,2 and, second "that there are no mitigating cir-
cumstances sufficiently substantial to call for mercy." 3 In Adamson's
case, the judge imposed the death penalty after finding as aggravating
circumstances that the murder was committed with a motive of "pecuni-
ary gain" 4 and that the murder was committed in an "especially heinous,
cruel or depraved" manner.5 In Adamson v. Ricketts,6 the Ninth Circuit
held that the Arizona Death Penalty statute deprives capital defendants
of their right to a jury decision on the elements of the crime in violation
of the sixth and fourteenth amendments.
7
The Ninth Circuit's holding at first seems inconsistent with two re-
cent Supreme Court decisions: McMillan v. Pennsylvania,8 holding that an
enhanced minimum sentence may be imposed on the basis of a judge's
finding that the defendant "visibly possessed a firearm" during the com-
mission of a felony, and Spaziano v. Florida,9 (affirmed in Hildwin v. Flor-
ida) 10 holding that the judge may make the sentencing decision in capital
cases. In its opinion, the Ninth Circuit distinguished both of these cases:
McMillan, on the ground that the consequences turning on the judge's
* Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh. I would like to thank Professor Bernard Hibbitts
for his very helpful comments on an earlier draft and Rebecca Dick-Hurwitz for her outstanding
research assistance.
1 Adamson v. Ricketts, 865 F.2d 1011, 1029 (9th Cir. 1988).
2 ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(E) (1978).
3 Id.
4 Id. at § 13-703(F)(5).
5 Id. at § 13-703(F)(6).
6 865 F.2d 1011 (9th Cir. 1988).
7 Id. at 1023. The Ninth Circuit held that the defendant's death penalty was also unconstitu-
tional on at least two other grounds: First, because the judge had sentenced the defendant to 48-49
years in prison following the defendant's earlier guilty plea to the same charge, the judge's imposi-
tion of the death penalty in the defendant's case was arbitrary in violation of the eighth and four-
teenth amendments, 865 F.2d at 1020; and, second, the aggravating circumstance that the murder
was "especially heinous, cruel, or depraved," which was found to exist in the defendant's case, "vio-
late[d] the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments by failing to channel adequately the decisionmaker's
discretion." Id. at 1029.
8 477 U.S. 79 (1986).
9 468 U.S. 447 (1984).
10 109 S. Ct. 2055 (1989).
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finding of fact-an increase in the minimum sentence in that case as op-
posed to a raising of the sentence from life imprisonment to death in
Adamson-were relatively insignificant, 1 and Spaziano, on the ground that
the Court in that case "never addressed an element of judicial fact-find-
ing as to an element of the offense."'
12
Near the beginning of its analysis, the Ninth Circuit stated that
"[t]he historic roots of the right to jury trial provide an essential back-
drop" 13 to the consideration of the issue presented. In the remainder of
its opinion, however, the court did not refer to the historical evidence
relating to the scope of the jury's fact-finding authority but instead as-
sessed the constitutionality of Arizona's sentencing scheme in light of the
modern Supreme Court decisions, particularly McMillan and Spaziano.14
In this Article, I will consider historical evidence relating to the
scope of the jury's fact-finding authority as well as the modern Supreme
Court decisions that bear on that issue. Using both of these sources, my
goal will be to develop a test for determining the circumstances under
which a defendant will have the constitutional right to a jury determina-
tion of facts that lead to enhanced sentencing. Although my test will
have general applicability, my primary focus will be on situations like
Adamson in which a finding of specific facts leads to a determination that
the defendant will be eligible for capital punishment.
Thus, my approach will be both normative and descriptive.
Through examining historical antecedents of the right to jury trial, Part
II will identify some of the concerns that should be important in defining
the scope of a defendant's constitutional right to jury fact-finding. Shift-
ing to the modern era, Part III will consider the Supreme Court decisions
that are pertinent to the capital defendant's right to jury trial at sentenc-
ing. Drawing upon both of these sources, Part IV will develop and apply
to the Adamson facts a test for determining the circumstances under which
a defendant will have the constitutional right to a jury determination of
facts that lead to an enhanced sentence. Part V will conclude with some
further applications of the test and some general observations.
II. Historical Antecedents of the Right to Jury Trial
A. The Relevance of History
What bearing should historical practices have on the scope of a de-
fendant's constitutional right to jury trial?' 5 Although a strict interpre-
tivist might argue that the jury trial guaranteed by the sixth amendment
should conform in all respects to the jury trial afforded criminal defend-
ants at the time of the sixth amendment's adoption,' 6 the Supreme Court
11 865 F.2d at 1027.
12 Id. at 1028.
13 Id. at 1023.
14 See 865 F.2d at 1023-29.
15 For a discussion of this question, see generally Nelson, History and Neutrality in Constitutional
Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REv. 1237, 1267-69 (1986).
16 See, e.g., R. BERGER, DEATH PENALTIES 66 (1982):
The Framers expressed their consent in well-understood common law terms. Substitu-
tion by the Court of its own meaning for that of the Framers changes the scope of the
[Vol. 65:1
CAPITAL DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL
has already indicated that the scope of the right to jury trial will be dic-
tated not so much by the nature ofjury trials that took place in 179117 as
by the historic concerns relating to jury trials that led to the adoption of
the sixth amendment.18
In Duncan v. Louisiana 19 the Court articulated the essential concern
that prompted the enactment of the defendant's constitutional right to
jury trial:
[T]he jury trial provisions in the Federal and State Constitutions
reflect a fundamental decision about the exercise of official power-a
reluctance to entrust plenary powers over the life and liberty of the
citizen to one judge or to a group ofjudges. Fear of unchecked power,
so typical of our State and Federal Governments in other respects,
found expression in the criminal law in this insistence upon commu-
nity participation in the determination of guilt or innocence.
20
Thus, the jury's essential role is to prevent government oppression by
serving as a buffer between the government and the individual.21 In as-
signing the jury this role, the framers of course drew from the English as
well as the colonial experience. The right to jury trial that the framers
viewed as an indispensable safeguard against government oppression
was essentially the right to jury trial that had evolved in England over the
course of several centuries. 22 Thus, the historic concerns that led to the
adoption of the sixth amendment right to jury trial are rooted to some
extent in the historical evolution of the English jury. In order to ascer-
tain these concerns, it is necessary to identify those aspects of the English
jury that might have seemed particularly pertinent during the period
when the Bill of Rights was adopted.
During the late eighteenth century, when the Bill of Rights was
adopted,23 the English jury (and its colonial counterpart) served as a
people's consent, displaces the Framers' value choices, and violates the basic principle of
government by consent of the governed.
17 Thus, the Court in Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 92 (1970), rejected the "assumption...
that ifa given feature existed in ajury at common law in 1789, then it was necessarily preserved in
the Constitution."
18 "The relevant inquiry, as we see it, must be the function that the particular feature performs
and its relation to the purposes of the jury trial." Id. at 99.
19 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
20 391 U.S. at 156.
21 In apparent response to Justice Harlan's observation "that the principal original virtue of the
jury trial-the limitations ajury imposes on a tyrannous judiciary-has largely disappeared [because]
.. judges ... are elected by the people or appointed by the people's elected officials," 391 U.S. at
188 (Harlan, J., dissenting), the majority said "Itihe framers of the constitution[ ] strove to create an
independent judiciary but insisted upon further protection against arbitrary action. Providing the
accused with the right to be tried by ajury of his peers gave him an inestimable safeguard against the
corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge." 391 U.S.
at 156.
22 See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. at 151 ("[B]y the time our Constitution was written,
jury trial in criminal cases had been in existence in England for several centuries and carried impres-
sive credentials traced by many to Magna Carta."). See generally F. McDONALD, Novus ORDO
SECLORJM 40 (1985) ("Having a voice.., in the lawmaking process was not the only right of En-
glishmen in regard to government, nor was it even the most important: the genuinely crucial right
was that of trial by jury.").
23 The Bill of Rights was adopted in 1791. See, e.g., R. RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF
RIGHTS 217 (1955); Levy, Bill of Rights, in ESSAYS ON THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 289 (L. Levy
ed. 2d ed. 1987).
19891
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
buffer against government oppression primarily by being the final arbiter
on all questions of fact. In 1765, Sir William Blackstone, an authority
who had enormous influence in the United States as well as in England,
2 4
referred to the English jury as the grand "palladium" of English lib-
erty.25 In delineating the jury's authority, he distinguished between
questions of fact and questions of law, explaining that "the principles
and axioms of law ... should be deposited in the breasts of the judges
.... But in settling and adjusting a question of fact ... a competent
number of sensible and upright jurymen... will be found the best inves-
tigators of truth and the surest guardians of public justice. ' 26 Twenty-
two years later, a lesser known English commentator stated the same
point more emphatically: "All that I have said or have to say upon the
subject ofJuries, is agreeable to this established maxim: 'thatJuries must
answer to questions of Fact and Judges to questions of Law.' This is the
fundamental maxim acknowledged by the Constitution." 27 Later author-
ities echoed this view of the jury's role.
28
The maxim that the jury must determine questions of fact does not
in itself clearly define the jury's constitutional role, however. The com-
mentators' statement of the jury's authority indicates that a defendant
who has the right to jury trial has a constitutional right to have the jury
rather than the judge make certain determinations, but exactly which
ones are uncertain. Distinguishing between questions of fact and ques-
tions of law (or questions of mixed law and fact) may be extremely diffi-
cult.2 9 Moreover, as Professor James Bradly Thayer pointed out,3t the
24 Included among those who read and acknowledged the authority of Blackstone's Commentlaries
were John Adams, Nathaniel Green, James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, John Jay and Patrick
Henry. Nolan, Sir lI'illiam Blackslone and the Ne, Amerfican Republic: .4 Study of Intellectual hnpacl, 51
N.Y.U. L. REV. 731, 743-45 (1976) [hereinafter Nolan]. See also B. MITCHELL & L. MITCHELL, A
BIOGRAPHY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UNITED STATES 22 (1964).
25 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *350.
26 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *379-80.
27 E. WYNNE, 3 EUNOMUS: DIALOGUES CONCERNING THE LAW AND CONSTITUTION OF ENGLAND 217
(2d ed. 1785).
28 See, e.g., United States v. Battiste, 24 F. Cas. 1042, 1043 (C.C.D. Mass. 1835) (No. 14,545)
(opinion by Story, J.) ("I hold it the most sacred constitutional right of every party accused of a
crime, that the jury should respond as to the facts, and the court as to the law."). See generally J.
PROFFATr, A TREATISE ON TRAIL BY JURY 318-19 (1880):
The importance of the distinction was pointed out by Lord Hardwicke when he said:
"It is of the greatest consequence to the law of England, and the subject, that the powers of
the judge and jury be kept distinct; that the judge determine the law and the jury the fact;
and if ever they become to be confounded, it will prove the confusion and the destruction
of the law of England." (quoting Rex v. Poole, 95 Eng. Rep. 15, 18, Cases Tempore Hard-
wicke 23, 28 (1734));
W. FORSYTH, HISTORY OF TRIAL BY JURY 235 (Morgan ed. 1875):
The distinction between the province of the judge and that of thejury is, in the English
law, clearly defined, and observed with jealous accuracy. The jury must in all cases deter-
mine the value and effect of evidence .... The law throws upon them the whole responsi-
bility of ascertainingfacts in dispute, and the judge does not attempt to interfere with the
exercise of their unfettered discretion in this respect. (emphasis added).
See also 3 COKE ON LITTLETON *155b ("The most usual trial of matters of fact is by twelve... men ...
and matters of law the judge ought to decide").
29 "[Tlhe appropriate methodology for distinguishing questions of fact from questions of law
has been, to say the least, elusive .... [T]he court has yet to arrive at a rule or principle that will
unerringly distinguish a factual finding from a legal conclusion." Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 113
(1985).
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jury's power to decide questions of fact is not absolute because the judge
has always decided certain questions of fact-the most obvious example
being questions of fact that relate to the admissibility of evidence.3 '
Thus, in defining the scope of the jury's constitutional fact-finding
power, historical sources will be particularly helpful in identifying the
types of determinations that those who adopted the sixth amendment
right to jury trial and the commentators who supported and influenced
its adoption were likely to view as questions of fact for the jury. Since
English legal scholars, 32 whose view of the jury trial was shaped by their
knowledge of the development of the English jury, undoubtedly influ-
enced the framers, historical material relating to the English jury's role in
determining facts may be particularly relevant. In addition, certain con-
troversies relating to the development of the English jury-because of
their relationship to events in seventeenth- or eighteenth-century
America-would have been likely to have a special impact on the framers.
With these considerations in mind, I will examine the English jury's fact-
finding role in thirteenth- to eighteenth-century homicide cases and in
eighteenth-century seditious libel cases. 33
A. The English Jury's Role in Homicide Cases
1. The Jury's Role During the Middle Ages
The precise origins of the English jury are uncertain.3 4 By the mid-
dle of the thirteenth century, however, the jury had displaced trial by
30 J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 185 (1898).
31 See generally Kaplan, Of Mabrus and Zorg-An Essay in Honor of David Louisell, 66 CALIF. L. REV.
987 (1978).
32 For example, in The Federalist, Alexander Hamilton, quoting Blackstone's famous phraseology,
referred to trial by jury as "the very palladium of free government." THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 499
(A. Hamiliton) (Heirloom ed. 1966). Later, in another work, Hamilton quoted Blackstone again, this
time to illustrate the importance ofjury trials as safeguards against the "dangerous engine of arbi-
trary government." Id. at 512.
33. The English jury's fact-finding role in thirteenth- to eighteenth-century homicide cases is ob-
viously relevant because it provides the best evidence of the framers' view of the jury's fact-finding
role in homicide cases. The jury's fact-finding role in eighteenth-century seditious libel cases would
have a particular significance to the framers because controversies relating to freedom of expression,
particularly the right to criticize government, were of special interest to the framers of the Constitu-
tion and the Bill of Rights. See generally R. RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OFTHE BILL OF RIGHTS 1776-1791 28
(1955) (One of the earliest resolutions of the Declarations of Rights was establishing freedom of the
press to diffuse "liberal sentiments on the administration of Government ... whereby oppressive
officers are shamed... into more honourable and just modes of conducting affairs."). See also infra
note 68. See also Levy, Bill of Rights, in ESSAYS ON THE MAKING OF THE CONsTrrtrrioN 302-03 (L. Levy
ed. 2d ed. 1987).
34 Thejury trial system was developed primarily during the reignofKing Henry Il. The Assizes
of Claredon (12 Hen. 2, c. 1, 1166) and Northampton (22 Hen. 2, c. 7, 1176) provided that twelve
men out of every hundred would periodically be summoned to' report on crimes occurring in their
neighborhoods. If, after evaluating the evidence, these presenting juries determined that the accusa-
tions had merit, the perpetrators were subjected to trial by ordeal to determine their guilt.
Suspects were occasionally allowed to circumvent this system through the use of an appeal.
Different from the modern day procedure of the same name, little else is known about the twelfth-
century appeals process other than it led, if granted, to an inquest. There, the jury (usually different
in composition from the presenting jury) would consider the facts of the case. If the accused was
found to be guilty, he still had to face the physical proof of trial by ordeal.
When trials by ordeal were forbade by the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215, this inquest system
gradually replaced them. At first, prisoners were given a choice between imprisonment (and inevita-
ble torture) and jury trial, but by 1275 the latter was considered to be the common law of the land.
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ordeal as the primary means for deciding criminal cases. 35 As Professor
Thomas Green has shown, "[t]he early English jury was self-informing
and composed of persons supposed to have first-hand knowledge of the
events and persons in question. The judge instructed the jury on the
law, but was himself almost entirely dependent upon the jury for his
knowledge of the case." 36 Thus, the original basis for the jury's role as
fact-finder was that the jurors were the only ones who knew the facts.
During the period when the jury had special knowledge of the facts,
the law of homicide was harsh. Although Anglo-Saxon law had distin-
guished between cold-blooded killing and killing in the heat of passion-
reserving the death penalty only for the former 37-the reforms of Henry
II obliterated this distinction and, with a few exceptions, made all inten-
tional killings capital offenses.
38
The most important of the exceptions related to killings in self-de-
fense. A defendant who intentionally killed in self-defense committed
excusable homicide 39 and was not eligible for capital punishment. 40 The
legal definition of self-defense was extremely restrictive, however. Pro-
fessor Green's research indicates that "[b]y the early thirteenth century,
this crucial category had come to be defined as slaying out of literally
vital necessity: the slayer, under mortal attack, had acted as a last resort
to save his own life."
'41
This harsh law of homicide-providing the death penalty for people
who killed after they were provoked or even after they were feloniously
attacked but had an opportunity to flee so as to avoid the use of deadly
force-undoubtedly clashed with community perceptions relating to just
deserts. 42 As representatives of the community, the jury had an opportu-
See generally A. KIRALFY, POTrER'S HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION To ENGLISH LAW AND ITS INSTITUTIONS
240-48 (4th ed. 1958); T. PLUNCKNETr, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMn MON LAW 112-20 (1956);
Groot, TheJuy of Presentment Before 1215, 26 Am. J. LEGAL HIST. 1 (1982); Groot, TheJuy in Private
Criminal Prosecutions Before 1215, 27 AM.J. LEGAL HIST. 113 (1983); Groot, The Eary-Thirteenth-Century
CriminalJiny, in TWELVE GOOD MEN AND TRUE 3 (J. S. Cockburn & T. A. Green eds. 1988).
35 Green, The Jry and the English Law of Homicide, 1200-1600, 74 MICH. L. REv. 414, 421 (1976)
[hereinafter Green I]. See also T. GREEN, VERDICT ACCORDING TO CONSCIENCE 19 (1985) [hereinafter
GREEN II].
36 Green I, supra note 35, at 414. This strict division of labor was not uniformly observed, how-
ever; juries sometimes passed on questions of law as well as fact. ChiefJustice Green acknowledged
this in 1364 when he instructed ajury to "[tlell us the whole case, and let us get together.., on the
law." Arnold, Law and Fact in the MedievalJury Tyial: Out of Sight, Out of Mind, 18 AM.J. LEGAL HIST.
267, 277 (1974). This occasional acquiescence to the juries' ability to determine questions of law
was partly due to the prevailing view during the middle ages that law and morals were essentially
coterminous. Therefore, ajuror who voted his conscience was usually well within the confines of the
law. Id. at 279.
37 Green I, supra note 35, at 416.
38 See 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 458-60 (2d ed. 1898).
39 By the thirteenth century, both felonious (slaying with criminal intent) and nonfelonious
homicide were recognized. The latter included two categories: justifiable and excusable. A killing
was justifiable if it occurred during an arrest of thieves or outlaws or by execution following a lawful
court order. Excusable homicide was reserved for those who killed accidentally, in self-defense, or
were of unsound mind. 2 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 358-59 (4th ed. 1927).
40 Felonious homicide was punishable by forfeiture of life or limb whereas a justifiable killing led
to acquittal. Excusable homicide was not as simple. The slayer was required to secure a royal par-
don; although this granted him immunity from royal suit, he was still vulnerable to a suit by the
victim's family. Id.
41 Green I, supra note 35, at 420.
42 Id.
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nity to mitigate the harshness of the law by finding the facts in a way that
would restrict the use of capital punishment. Professor Green's research
indicates that the early jury took advantage of this opportunity.43 Based
on a comparison between the original charges and verdicts as well as an
examination of the proportion of cases involving acquittals and findings
of self-defense,44 he concludes that by the end of the fourteenth century
the jury exercised substantial nullification power: "[D]uring the later
Middle Ages jury convictions were largely limited to the most culpable
homicides. Defendants who had committed simple homicides, loosely
corresponding to the modem categories of unpremeditated murder and
manslaughter, received acquittals or were found to have killed in the
course of excusable self-defense."
45
2. The Jury's Role During the Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries
During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the modem crimi-
nal trial evolved. 46 By the end of this period, witnesses testified to evi-
dence in a court presided over by a judge. After being charged by the
judge, the jury returned its verdict based on the evidence presented.
47
Because the jury no longer had personal knowledge of the facts, the
Crown's power to control or influence jury verdicts increased. Professor
John Langbein's examination of seventeenth-century criminal trials48 in-
dicates that judges sometimes exercised this power by essentially di-
recting a guilty verdict49 or refusing to accept the jury's not guilty
verdict.50 ' Moreover, when the jury was recalcitrant, judges sometimes
resorted to even sterner measures. On occasion, juries were threatened
with fines or even imprisonment if they failed to return the verdict
sought by the Crown.5'
During this same period, the law of homicide became more complex.
The concepts of killing in "hot blood"5 2 or without premeditation 53 be-
came important for the purpose of determining which offenders would
be likely to be spared capital punishment because they were eligible for
43 Id. at 432.
44 Id. at 430.
45 Id. at 432.
46 See generally Langbein, The Origins of Public Prosecution at Common Law, 17 Am. J. LEGAL HIST.
313, 314-15 (1973) [hereinafter Langbein, Origins].
47 See GREEN II, supra note 35, at 273.
48 Langbein, The Criminal Trial Before the Lawyers, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 263 (1978) [hereinafter
Langbein, Criminal Trial].
49 Langbein, Criminal Trial, supra note 48, at 286.
50 Id. at 291-96.
51 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *36 1; 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 344
(5th ed. rev. 1942); T. TASWELL-LANGMEAD, ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 138 (6th ed. rev.
1905); GREEN II, supra note 35, at 209.
52 By 1612 the charge for any killing in hot blood, upon provocation, was manslaughter, not
murder. Half a century later the definition narrowed. Mere words were no longer sufficient to con-
stitute provocation unless they resulted in a brawl in sudden heat. 8 W..HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 303 (4th ed. 1927).
53 Several siatutes during this time noted the distinction of killing with malice aforethought in-
cluding: 4 Hen. 8 (1512) ("murder upon malice prepensed"); 23 Hen. 8 (1531) ("willful murder of
malice prepensed"); and 1 Edw. 6 (1547) ("murder of malice prepensed"). See 3 J. STEPHEN, A
HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 44 (1883).
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benefit of clergy.54 Since these concepts related to a defendant's state of
mind, 55 the murkiness of the required factual determinations inevitably
vested the jury with considerable discretion. Confronted with a case in
which a defendant killed another person under extenuating circum-
stances, a jury's determination that the defendant acted in "hot blood"
or without premeditation could not easily be called into question. "[I]n
fact many cases lay so close to the legal line between capital and clergy-
able homicide that the bench had no grounds for second-guessing the
jury." 5
6
Because of these doctrinal developments, the law of homicide now
more closely mirrored community values. This change, as well as the
subjective nature of the factual findings required, decreased the possibil-
ity of friction between the Crown and juries. In contrast to the earlier
period,57 juries would be more likely to find the facts in a way that judges
would view as acceptable. Moreover, to the extent that the jury contin-
ued to find facts against the evidence in order to remove a particular
homicide defendant from the threat of the death penalty, judges may
have sometimes welcomed this means of mitigating the law's harshness.58
Nevertheless, by the end of the seventeenth century, it was apparent
that the tension between judges and juries had increased. This height-
ened tension was particularly obvious in trials involving seditious libel or
other political offenses. 59 But it was also evident in homicide trials.
When ChiefJustice Kelynge was charged with improper judicial conduct
in 1667, three of the charges against him related to his coercion ofjuries
in homicide cases. 60 In one, for example, "a master's helper had beaten
a boy 'about the head with a broomstaff' for doing careless work.
54 The concept of benefit of clergy developed late in the twelfth century. Ordained clergymen
who committed felonies were initially tried by the Crown, and, if found guilty, were subsequently
tried by an ecclesiastical court. If convicted a second time, the clergymen were subjected only to
such punishment as the latter courts could inflict. These included relegation to a monastery, brand-
ing with an iron and life imprisonment, but stopped short of the death penalty. I F. POLLOCK & F.
MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 441-42 (2d ed. 1898).
By the end of the fifteenth century, the nature of the protection had changed. Although it had
expanded to include not only anyone even marginally connected with the church but also anyone
who could read, certain crimes were excluded from its scope. Statutes were enacted between the
sixteenth and eighteenth centuries that declared at least 160 offenses, including murder, to be felo-
nies without benefit of clergy. The protection was abolished altogether in 1827. 3 W. HOLDSWORTH,
A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 297, 301 (5th ed. rev. 1927). See also I J. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE
CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 465-72 (1883); A. MANCHESTER, MODERN LEGAL HISTORY 249 (1980).
55 See, e.g., Regina v. Mawgridge, 84 Eng. Rep. 1107, 1111 (1708):
[H]e that designs and useth the means to do ill is malicious.... He that doth a cruel act
voluntarily, doth it of malice prepensed.... Therefore when a man shall without any prov-
ocation stab another with a dagger ... this is express malice, for he designedly and pur-
posely did him the mischief.
56 GREEN II. supa note 35, at 126.
57 See supra text accompanying notes 32-44.
58 GREEN II, supra note 35, at 149.
59 See 8 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 345 (7th ed. 1956); T. TASWELL-
LANGMEAD, ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 124 (10th ed. 1946).
60 ChiefJustice Kelynge was only two years into his service as ChiefJustice of the King's Bench
when charges against him for scandalous behavior were brought before the House of Commons. In
addition to vilifying the Magna Carta and making arbitrary rulings, he was accused of compelling
jurors to find verdicts contrary to their inclinations. When they returned verdicts in opposition to
his direction, Chief justice Kelynge did not hesitate to threaten them with fines or imprisonment
until the desired results were reached. This conduct was seen as particularly indefensible with re-
[Vol. 65:1I
CAPITAL DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL
Kelynge would not accept a verdict of manslaughter and threatened the
jury with a fine. This produced the result he wanted: murder was found,
and the defendant was hanged, in spite of the recommendation of 'gen-
tlemen' of the county that he be spared." 61 The charges against Kelynge
led to a House of Commons resolution that a bill should be drafted mak-
ing the threatening of jurors with fines and imprisonment as a result of
their verdicts illegal. Although the bill died in committee, the principle
stated therein was essentially adopted in Bushell's Case, decided three
years later.
Bushell's Case held that a judge could not fine or imprison the jury
because he disagreed with its verdict. 62 As Langbein has demon-
strated, 63 Bushell's Case, in itself, did not free jurors. from the possibility of
coercion from the Crown because judges could influence jurors through
other means besides threatening them with fine or imprisonment. 64 Nev-
ertheless, Langbein concludes that "Bushell's Case did indeed become a
landmark in expanding the province of the jury, but not for about a cen-
tury after it was decided." 65 Thus, by the time the sixth amendment was
adopted, the principle established in Bushell's Case had expanded so as to
provide the jury with authority to determine facts without interference.
The jury's power to determine facts without interference was not
viewed as an unmixed blessing by eighteenth-century legal scholars.
gard to homicide cases, where it was "of dangerous consequence to the lives and liberties of the
people of England." I J. CAMPBELL, THE LIVES OF THE CHIEFJUSTICES 509-10 (1849).
61 GREEN II, supra note 35, at 214.
62 Bshell's Case arose after a London jury acquitted William Penn and his co-preacher William
Meade of the charge of causing an unlawful assembly and a disturbance of the peace. Dissatisfied
with this verdict, the judge fined the jurors for finding contrary to the evidence and the law. Bushell,
one of the jurors, was imprisoned because of his refusal to pay the fine. He sought his release by
filing a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his imprisonment was unlawful because the judge lacked
power to fine jurors as a result of their verdicts. See GREEN 1I, supra note 35, at 221-26. Thus,
Bushells Case raised the basic issue of whether the jury could be punished for exercising its authority
to acquit in the face of the evidence.
ChiefJustice Vaughan's opinion in Bushell's Case held that jurors may not be fined or imprisoned
for their verdicts. Case of the Imprisonment of Edward Bushell, 6 Howell's State Trials 999, 1010,
124 Eng. Rep. 1006, 1012 (1670). Although Penn and Meade had argued at their trial that thejury
had power to reject an unjust law, see GREEN II, supra note 35, at 223, Vaughan's holding was justified
entirely on the basis that the jurors have sole authority to determine the facts. ChiefJustice Vaughan
supported this position primarily on the ground that the jury's role has always been to determine the
true facts and there is no reason to suppose that the judge or anyone else is in a better position to
make that determination. Thus, it follows that the jury's authority to determine questions of fact
precludes ajudge from concluding that ajury's verdict is contrary to law. Bushells Case at 1012.
63 Langbein, Criminal Trial, supra note 48, at 298.
64 For example, in the case of Ralph Leach, reported in the Old Bailey Sessions Papers (OBSP),
December, 1678, the jury was directed to find the defendant guilty despite his testimony that the silk
stockings he allegedly stole were secured as payment of an outstanding debt. See Langbein, Criminal
Trial, supra note 48, at 286. In Stephen Arrowsmith's case, also reported in OBSP, December, 1678,
the defendant was tried for the statutory rape of a nine year old girl. Thejury responded to Arrow-
smith's evidence by acquitting him. However, the court, clearly displeased by this verdict, instructed
the jury to "reconsider" its decision. After the second deliberation, the jury convicted Arrowsmith,
who was subsequently sentenced to death. Langbein, Criminal Trial, supra note 48, at 291-95.
Finally, the case of Hugh Coleman, OBSP, February, 1718, involved a charge of bigamy. It
became clear to the judge during the trial that there would not be sufficient evidence to convict. He
brought the proceedings to an abrupt halt and told the defendant's wives to obtain better proof,
noting that Coleman would remain imprisoned in the meantime.' Langbein, cimhial Trial, supra note
48, at 287, 291-95.
65 Langbein, Criminal Trial, supra note 48, at 298.
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During the late eighteenth century, Cesare Beccaria's treatise, On Crimes
and Punishments,66 precipitated an English movement towards penal re-
form.67 One of the reform movement's central tenets was that certainty
of punishment was the best deterrent to crime. The English jury sys-
tem-under which the jury exercised considerable discretionary author-
ity to acquit or find the defendant guilty of a lesser offense against the
evidence-decreased the likelihood that a given punishment would be
imposed for a particular offense. This led some of the eighteenth-cen-
tury English reformers to oppose jury mitigation in traditional felony
cases.6
8
William Blackstone, whose Commentaries on the Laws of England 69 was
widely read and accepted by the drafters of the Constitution and the Bill
of Rights, 70 was one of the eighteenth-century English reformers who
recognized the conflict between the reform movement's penological
goals and the role traditionally played by the English jury. Significantly,
however, Blackstone did not advocate any major alteration of the jury's
role. On the contrary, he concluded that whatever reforms were under-
taken regarding sanctions for common law felonies, the jury would have
to retain its traditional fact-finding power because "in times of difficulty
and danger, more is to be apprehended from the violence and partiality
of judges appointed by the Crown, in suits between the king and the
subject, than in disputes between one individual and another."'71
Although retaining juries would undoubtedly occasion some costs-in
terms of inconsistent punishments-these costs to Blackstone were
merely "inconveniences" 7 2 that would have to be borne because of the
importance of retaining the jury.
73
Thus, by the time the Bill of Rights was adopted at the end of the
eighteenth century, the English jury's role in determining critical facts in
homicide cases was entrenched. As fact-finder, the jury had the power to
determine not only whether the defendant was guilty of homicide but
also the degree of the offense. Moreover, the jury's role in finding facts
that would determine a homicide defendant's eligibility for capital pun-
ishment was particularly well established. Throughout its history, the
jury determined which homicide defendants would be subject to capital
66 C. BECCARIA, ESSAY ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS (1767).
67 On the impact of Beccaria's thinking on late eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century Eng-
land, see A.H. MANCHESTER, A MODERN LEGAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND AND WALES, 1750-1950 240
(1980). On his influence in America, see J. Funston & R. Funston, Cesare Beccaria and the Founding
Fathers, 3 ITALIAN AMERICANA 73 (1976).
68 See GREEN II, surpa note 35, at 290-9 1.
69 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES.
70 Unlike the works of many legal commentators before him, Blackstone's Commentaries was com-
prehensive, relatively easy to read and required no prior legal study. Therefore, it was an instant
success in the United States as well as in England. Among those who ordered copies of the domestic
edition were sixteen signatories of the Declaration of Independence, six delegates to the 1787 Con-
stitutional Convention, one future President of the United States and one future ChiefJustice of the
Supreme Court. Nolan, supra note 24, at 736-37, 743-44. See also supra note 24.
71 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *343.
72 Id. at *344.
73 "[Tlhe liberties of England cannot but subsist so long as this palladium remains sacred and
inviolate; not only from all open attacks... but also from all secret machinations which may sap and
undermine it .... " Id. at *343.
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punishment by making factual determinations, many of which related to
difficult assessments of the defendant's state of mind.74 By the time the
Bill of Rights was adopted, the jury's right to make these determinations
was unquestioned.
3. The Libel Law Controversy
The seditious libel cases of the eighteenth century are important
both because of their impact in defining the jury's fact-finding role and
their probable significance to the framers of the Bill of Rights. The cases
have a significant bearing on the scope of the jury's role in fact-finding
because they involved a situation in which there was a serious and pro-
longed debate concerning the allocation of fact-finding authority be-
tween judge and jury. Moreover, in view of the framers' special concern
for laws that restricted freedom of speech, this debate undoubtedly
played an important part in shaping the framers' view of the jury's role in
fact-finding.75
Seditious libel was originally a common law crime. 76 Thus, its ele-
ments were not authoritatively set down but evolved over the course of
time. In order to establish seditious libel in England during the eight-
eenth century, the prosecution apparently had to prove at least that the
writing in question was seditious and that the defendant's act of publish-
ing it was malicious.7 7 The jury's role in fact-finding was extremely lim-
ited, however. 78 It was required to return "a general verdict of 'guilty' if
it found that the accused intentionally published the writing and that the
writing bore the meaning alleged by the prosecution."7 9 In the event of
74 For example, Judge Cardozo commented on the difficulty in determining whether a killing
was premeditated:
If intent is deliberate and premeditated whenever there is choice, then in truth it is always
deliberate and premeditated, since choice is involved in the hypothesis of the intent. What
we have is merely a privilege offered to the jury to find the lesser degree when the sudden-
ness of the intent, the vehemence of the passion, seems to call irresistibly for the exercise of
mercy.
B. CARDOZO, LAW AND LITERATURE AND OTHER ESSAYS AND ADDRESSES 99-100 (1931). See also C.
BLACK, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE INEVITABILITY OF CAPRICE AND MISTAKE 48-50 (1974) (difficulty in
determining distinctions between different states of mind).
75 Publicity generated by seditious libel cases in the eighteenth century served to create a new
awareness among American colonists of the need for freedom of speech and of the press. Black-
stone's view, that the latter guaranteed only lack of prepublication restrictions and that open criti-
cism of the government still bore the threat of liability, fell into disfavor. Instead, the notion grew
that people should decide for themselves whether certain publications were libelous. The evolution
of first amendment protection and of the changing role ofjuries to fact-finders were both logical
consequences of this gradually emerging attitude. N. ROSENBERG, PROTECTING THE BEST MEN (1986)
[hereinafter N. ROSENBERG]. See also Nelson, Seditious Libel in Colonial America, 3 Am. J. LEGAL HIST.
160 (1959) (use of seditious libel as a means of governmental control over the press was largely
eliminated by the Zenger trial in 1735); See supra note 33.
76 See 8 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 340-46 (4th ed. 1927).
77 More specifically, the mid-eighteenth-century common law crime of seditious libel consisted
of 1) the intentional, 2) publication of a, 3) written, 4) blame of any public man, or of the law, or of
any institution established by law, 5) without lawful excuse or justification. Schauer, The Role of the
People in First Amendmnent Theory, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 761, 762 (1986). Establishing that the defendant
intentionally published a statement referring to the subject in question usually was sufficient to meet
all five elements. See also W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 76, at 342.
78 See GREEN II, supra note 35, at 319; T. PLUCKNETr, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW
500-01 (5th ed. 1956). See also W. ODGERS, AN OUTLINE OF THE LAW OF LIBEL 201 (1897).
79 Id. at 319.
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a guilty verdict, the judge would then resolve the ultimate question of
guilt or innocence by determining "as matters of law two questions that
had the appearance of questions of fact: whether the act was done with
criminal intent, and whether the writing was seditious or defamatory."
8 0
The jury's limited role in fact-finding was attacked on two fronts.
Adopting the view that thejurors are ultimatejudges of the law as well as
facts, some commentators argued that the jury "must acquit if it is con-
vinced that the facts charged in the indictment do not amount to a
crime."8 ' Others took a more limited approach that focused entirely on
the restrictions placed on the jury's role in fact-finding. One argued, for
example, that as "judges of fact.., the jury must consider all the 'cir-
cumstances,' (e.g., truth, intent) involved."' 2 Significantly, lawyers and
scholars making this argument sometimes drew upon the jury's role in
homicide cases as an appropriate analogy.8 3 Since juries determined
facts relating to the defendant's state of mind in those cases, so the argu-
ment went, there was no reason why they should be precluded from do-
ing so in libel cases.
84
Specific cases, 85 as well -as writings in legal and political journals,
played a part in the emerging debate. The New York trial ofJohn Peter
Zenger,8 6 which has been characterized as "the first, and the most impor-
tant, step toward freedom of the press in America,"8 7 was one of the
most significant of these cases. 88 Zenger, the publisher of the New York
Weekly Journal 89 was charged in an information with "printing and pub-
80 Id.
81 Id. at 323.
82 Id. See also infra notes 151 & 156 and accompanying text.
83 Id. See also infra text accompanying note 158.
84 Andrew Hamilton addressed this point in 1735 while defending John Peter Zenger at the
latter's seditious libel trial:
[U]pon indictment for murder, the jury may, and almost instantly do, take upon them to
judge whether the evidence will amount to murder or manslaughter, and find accordingly;
and I must say I cannot see why in our case the jury have not at least as good a right to say
whether our newspapers are a libel or no libel as another jury has to say whether killing of a
man is murder or manslaughter.
J. ALEXANDER, A BRIEF NARRATIVE OF THE CASE AND TRIAL OF JOHN PETER ZENGER 91 (S. Katz ed. 2d
ed. 1972) [hereinafterJ. ALEXANDER]. See also GREEN II, supra note 35, at 323 (documents published
during this time compared fact-finding in homicide cases to fact-finding in cases of libel).
85 In The Trial of William Owen, 18 Howell's State Trials 1203, 1222 (1752), the jury insisted
on judging the matter of law as well as of fact, despite the Solicitor's instruction that they find only
whether "defendant Owen published the pamphlet. The rest follows, of course. If the fact is
proved, the libel proves itself sedition." The defendant was acquitted.
In The Trial of John Almon, 20 Howell's State Trials 803, 834 (1770), the defendant book-
seller's attorney asserted, "to constitute criminality, it is necessary there should be a wicked inten-
tion.... [T]he same rules that extend to a man's answering for every act of wrong, where there is an
intention, certainly the same rules must acquit when there is no indeed intention." Almon was,
nevertheless, convicted.
86 17 Howell's State Trials 675 (1735).
87 V. BURANELLI, TIE TRIAL OF PETER ZENGER 53 (1957) [hereinafter V. BURANELLI].
88 Zenger's trial had an impact on English as well as on American law. Widespread reports of
the trial spawned fresh criticism in England of the law of seditious libel and the jury manipulation it
entailed. Following The Trial of William Owen, 18 Howell's State Trials 1203, several emphatically
pro-jury tracts were published, demanding jury autonomy. See GREEN II, supra note 35, at 322-24.
89 The Journal was America's first party newspaper, founded and edited by James Alexander.
Created specifically as an instrument of propaganda, it contained essays, spurious letters to the edi-
tor and even advertisements, all critical of the Governor of New York and his administration. The
paper was published and printed at Zenger's shop. Although the Journal was known as "Zenger's
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lishing a false, scandalous, and seditious libel in which His Excellency,
the Governor of this Province .... is greatly and unjustly scandalized as a
person that has no regard to law orjustice." 90 Colonial New York's law
of seditious libel was similar to English law. The jury was only to "deter-
mine the fact of publication.., and at whom the contents were aimed,
after which its function would have been fulfilled." 9 1 Thus, in Zenger's
Case, the only question ostensibly to be decided by the jury was whether
the defendant had published the issues of the Journal that made deroga-
tory statements about the Governor of New York.
92
At Zenger's trial, Andrew Hamilton, the defendant's, famous law-
yer,93 admitted that Zenger had published the relevant issues of theJour-
nal.9 4 When the New York Attorney General then claimed that the jury
"must find a verdict for the King," 95 Hamilton argued, however, that the
jury must determine the facts alleged in the information: "For the words
themselves must be libelous-that is, false, scandalous, and seditious-or
else we are not guilty."
96
Hamilton particularly argued that the jury should be entitled to de-
cide whether the words published were truthful. 97 While Hamilton's at-
tempt to persuade the judge that the jury must determine this question
was unsuccessful, he was successful in exposing the jury to argument on
this issue.98 Thus, even though the court refused to receive defendant's
evidence that the statements made in the Journal were true,99 Hamilton
argued to the jury that they should acquit because they were themselves
"witnesses to the truth of the facts we have offered."' 00
paper," Alexander was its driving force. Zenger's role continued to be limited to that of a printer. J.
ALEXANDER, supra note 84, at 8-9; V. BURANELLI, supra note 87, at 27.
90 V. BURANELLI, supra note 87, at 94. The New York 'eekly Journal exercised little restraint in its
quest to ridicule Governor Cosby and his associates. Lampoons of the Governor's administration
included a transparently worded advertisement for the return of a lost spaniel, clearly meant to be
identified as Cosby's publicist. Cosby himself was referred to by a multitude of unflattering terms
including "monkey," "overgrown criminal" and "impudent monster." These attacks were not re-
stricted to Cosby's political maneuverings but extended to his personal life. Even his wife was the
occasional target of the paper's parodies.
However, the bulk of the criticism was centered around the administration's corrupt political
practices. The Jounal accused Cosby of accepting bribes, rigging elections, illegally displacing
judges and generally overstepping the boundaries of his power. Id. at 41-43. See alsoJ. ALEXANDER,
supra note 84, at 9; N. ROSENBERG, supra note 75, at 35.
91 V. BURANELLI, supra note 87, at 58.
92 Id. at 106-08.
93 Selecting a lawyer to defend Zenger was not an easy matter. Not only were New York attor-
neys scarce, but most professed loyalty to Governor Cosby. Fortunately, (from Zenger's perspec-
tive) Andrew Hamilton, a friend and professional associate ofJames Alexander's, eagerly agreed to
take the case. Not only was the Philadelphia attorney considered to be one of the best in the coun-
try, but he also had a history of opposition to the proprietary government of Pennsylvania. The
combination of his antigubenatorial sympathies and his extensive courtroom experience proved to
be invaluable to the defense. J. ALEXANDER, supra note 84, at 21-22.
94 V. BURANELLI, supra note 87, at 98-99.
95 Id. at 99.
96 Id.
97 Id. During this period, truth was not a defense to seditious libel; on the contrary, true stories
were considered to be the most harmful since they were the most likely to provoke unrest. V.
BURANELLI, supra note 87, at 53-54.
98 Id. at 108.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 112.
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This argument, which was also used by Justice Vaughan in Bushell's
Case, 101 referred to the jury's ancient function of deciding cases on the
basis of its special knowledge of the facts. 10 2 Although seventeenth- and
eighteenth-century jurors were no longer selected because of their
knowledge of the facts,' 03 the use of this argument demonstrated that
lawyers and scholars of this period were well aware of the jury's historical
function and drew from that function the inference that jurors must have
the authority to determine the facts relating to the offense with which the
defendant was charged.
After hearing Hamilton's argument, thejury at Zenger's trial needed
only a few minutes to acquit.' 0 4 Following Zenger's acquittal, the report
of the case was published and widely circulated in England. 10 5 Hamil-
ton's theory as to the role of the jury in seditious libel cases thus had
considerable impact in England as well as America.
10 6
In 1792, just one year after the adoption of the Bill of Rights, the
campaign against the English seditious libel law culminated with the pas-
sage of Fox's Libel Act. That Act specifically provided that the jury
"shall not be directed . . . to find the defendant guilty 'merely of the
proof of the publication . . . and of the sense ascribed to the same
.... "107 Moreover, by giving the jury authority to determine "the
whole matter put in issue," the law implicitly affirmed thejury's authority
to determine the facts relating to the critical issues of the defendant's
criminal intent and whether the writing was seditious.
The importance of the seditious libel cases in shaping thejury's fact-
finding role can hardly be overestimated. The point of cases like Zenger's
Case was not that the crime of libel had to include particular elements,
but rather that the presence or absence of those elements-whatever
they were had to be determined by a jury. Thus, the libel law contro-
versy went far towards establishing that a criminal defendant's right to a
jury trial includes a right to have a jury determination with respect to
every element of the criminal charge.
III. Supreme Court Authority
Surprisingly, the Supreme Court has seldom considered whether a
criminal defendant has a constitutional right to ajury determination as to
specific facts. In a line of decisions dealing with the prosecutor's consti-
101 Case of the Imprisonment of Edward Bushell, 6 Howell's State Trials 999, 1011, 124 Eng.
Rep. 1006, 1012 (1670) ("Being returned of the vicinage, whence the cause of action ariseth, the law
supposeth [the jurors] thence to have sufficient knowledge to try the matter in issue.., though no
evidence were given on either side in court, but to this evidence the judge is a stranger.").
102 See supra text accompanying notes 35-36.
103 Langbein, Criminal Trial, supra note 48, at 306.
104 V. BURANELLI, supra note 87, at 132.
105 Id. at 63.
106 See GREEN II, supra note 35, at 322-23.
107 10 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAv 690 (5th ed. rev. 1942). Fox's Libel Act
affirmatively established that publication alone was not enough to convict a defendant of seditious
libel. Instead, it was established that a jury would consider all the facts of the case and would find a
defendant not guilty if he lacked criminal intent or if the publication were true. Id. at 691.
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tutional obligation to prove facts beyond a reasonable doubt, 0 8 the
Court has suggested-though not held-that the defendant will have a
right to jury trial as to facts that are an element of a criminal offense. On
the other hand, as I have already indicated,' 0 9 McMillan v. Pennsylvania 10
established that in certain situations the judge will be permitted to make
factual determinations that lead to enhanced sentencing, and Spaziano v.
Florida 1 held that a capital defendant does not have the constitutional
right to a jury determination as to sentencing. These authorities estab-
lish the parameters of a criminal defendant's constitutional right to ajury
determination as to specific facts.
The cases defining the prosecutor's obligation to prove facts beyond
a reasonable doubt begin with In re Winship. 1 2 In Winship the Court held
that "the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction ex-
cept upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to
constitute the crime with which he is charged."' 1 In subsequent cases,
including Mullaney v. Wilbur 114 and Patterson v. New York," 15 the Court has
elaborated as to what is a "fact necessary to constitute the crime" within
the meaning of Winship. 1 6 For example, in McMillan v. Pennsylvania 117
the Court indicated that the defendant's right to a jury trial will extend
only to those facts and no further.I"
In Mullaney v. Wilbur 119 the Court considered the constitutionality of
a Maine murder conviction. Maine's homicide statute required a defend-
ant charged with murder to prove that he acted "in the heat of passion
on sudden provocation" in order to reduce a homicide charge from mur-
108 See, e.g., Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684
(1975); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). See generally Jeffries & Stephan, Defenses, Presumptions, and
Burden of Proof in the Criminal Law, 88 YALE LJ. 1325 (1979) [hereinafter Jeffries & Stephan].
109 See supra text accompanying notes 8-9.
110 477 U.S. 79 (1986).
111 468 U.S. 447 (1984).
112 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
113 Id. at 364.
114 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
115 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
116 For later cases dealing with this question, see Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228 (1987) (states may
constitutionally require a defendant to affirmatively establish self-defense by a preponderance of the
evidence as long as the government is required to prove all the elements of murder beyond a reason-
able doubt); Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985) (the fourteenth amendment's requirement that
the state prove every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt is violated by use of a jury
instruction creating a mandatory presumption of criminal intent). See generally Dripps, The Constitu-
tional Status of the Reasonable Doubt Rule, 75 CALIF. L. REv. 1665 (1987).
117 477 U.S. 79 (1986).
118 In McMillan, the Court summarily rejected the defendants' argument that Pennsylvania's sen-
tencing statute deprived them of their sixth amendment right to a jury trial with respect to facts
leading to an enhanced sentence: "Having concluded that Pennsylvania may properly treat visible
possession as a sentencing consideration and not an element of any offense, we need only note that
there is no Sixth Amendment right to jury sentencing, even where the sentence turns on specific
findings of fact." Id. at 93.
This language clearly indicates that defendants will not have a right to jury trial as to facts that
are.not elements of an offense within the meaning of Winship. Although the Court did not address
the question, its terse analysis of the issue suggested that the converse would also be the case. In
other words, a defendant will be entitled to a jury trial only as to facts that are elements of the
offense within the meaning of H'inship.
119 421 U.S. 684 (1975). "
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der to manslaughter.' 2 0 At the defendant's trial, the judge instructed the
jury that malice aforethought-the mental element required for a murder
conviction-was to be "conclusively implied unless the defendant proved
by a fair preponderance of the evidence that he acted in the heat of pas-
sion on sudden provocation."'
' 21
Although the Court accepted the Maine Supreme Court's determi-
nation that murder and manslaughter are punishment categories of the
single offense of felonious homicide, 22 it nevertheless held that Maine's
statute was in violation of the rule established in Winship. In reaching
this conclusion, the Court rejected the government's argument that the
Winship requirement should only apply to facts that must be proved to
establish the defendant's liability for a criminal offense: "This analysis
fails to recognize that the criminal law of Maine, like that of other juris-
dictions, is concerned not only with guilt or innocence in the abstract but
also with the degree of criminal culpability."' 123 The Court added that
the element of provocation was important not only because of its histori-
cal role in assessing the defendant's blameworthiness 124 but also because
of its significance in terms of penal consequences. It emphasized that, to
the defendant, the difference between a finding of provocation or non-
provocation "may be of greater importance than the difference between
guilt or innocence for many lesser crimes."'
125
In Patterson v. New York 126 the Court limited the scope of its holding
in Mullaney. In Patterson, the defendant was convicted of murder in New
York. New York's homicide statute defined manslaughter as the inten-
tional killing of another while acting under extreme emotional distur-
bance.' 27 The statute required the defendant to bear the burden of
proving the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance. 28
Based on this statute, the judge instructed the jury that the defendant
had the burden of proving emotional disturbance.
In upholding the constitutionality of the New York statute, the Court
limited Mullaney to a situation in which the fact at issue is defined as an
element of the offense. 129 Maine law had specified "malice" as an essen-
tial ingredient of murder. "Malice" denoted both the mental state re-
quired to establish murder and the absence of sudden heat of passion
based on adequate provocation. Therefore, as the Court explained in
Patterson, requiring the defendant to prove provocation violated his due
process rights by relieving the prosecution of its obligation to prove
every element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt.'30 In
120 Id.
121 Id. at 686.
122 Id. at 691.
123 Id. at 697-98.
124 Id. at 696 ("[Tlhe fact at issue here-the presence or absence of the heat of passion on sud-
den provocation-has been almost from the inception of the common law of homicide, the single
most important factor in determining the degree of culpability attaching to an unlawful homicide.").
125 Id. at 698.
126 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
127 Id. at 198.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 215.
130 Id.
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contrast, New York's homicide statute avoided the term "malice." Thus,
Patterson was distinguished on the basis that "this'law did not formally
identify the absence of extreme emotional disturbance as part of its defi-
nition of murder .... ,"131
While the Court acknowledged that this line of analysis might "seem
to permit state legislatures to reallocate burdens of proof by labeling as
affirmative defenses at least some elements of the crimes now defined in
their statutes,"' 32 it stated, without significant elaboration, that "there
are obviously constitutional limits beyond which the States may not go in
this regard."
33
Assuming that the defendant does have a right to jury trial as to
"every fact necessary to constitute the crime.., charged," 134 Mullaney, as
limited by Patterson, indicates that the defendant will at least have a right
to jury trial as to facts that are specified in the criminal statute as ele-
ments of the offense. Moreover, Patterson indicates that the state's consti-
tutional power to characterize facts that trigger enhanced criminal
liability as something other than elements of the offense is limited.
Spaziano and McMillan both deal with situations in which the judge is
authorized to find facts that relate to sentencing. Spaziano specifically in-
volved the constitutionality of Florida's capital sentencing scheme which
provides that, after hearing evidence and argument relating to aggravat-
ing and mitigating circumstances, the jury recommends a sentence; then,
after considering the jury's recommendation, the judge imposes a sen-
tence on the basis of her independent assessment of the aggravating and
mitigating circumstances. 3 5 In Spaziano's case, after weighing the evi-
dence presented at the penalty trial, the jury recommended a sentence of
life imprisonment. The trial judge concluded, however, that "notwith-
standing the recommendation of the jury[,] ... sufficient aggravating cir-
cumstances existed to justify and authorize a death sentence[,] . . . [and]
the mitigating circumstances were insufficient to outweigh such aggravat-
ing circumstances .... ,,136 Specifically, the judge determined that two
aggravating circumstances-that the homicide was especially heinous
and atrocious and that the defendant had been previously convicted of a
felony-were present' 3 7 and that there were no mitigating circumstances
"except, perhaps, the age [28] of the defendant."' 3 8
131 Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 108, at 1342 (citing 432 U.S. at 206-07, 216).
132 432 U.S. at 210.
133 Id. The Court did state that legislation allowing for a presumption of guilt based solely on the
identification of the accused or the finding of an indictment would be unconstitutional. Id.
134 McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 84 (1986).
135 FLA. STAT. § 921.141(3) (1983). At the time of Spaziano's trial, the sentencing judge was
directed to impose sentence based on a weighing of statutorily defined aggravating and mitigating
circumstances. The statute was amended in 1979 (three years after Spaziano's trial) so that the judge
imposes sentence based on a determination of whether statutory aggravating circumstances are out-
weighed by aq relevant mitigating evidence. 468 U.S. 447, 451 n.4 (1984) (emphasis added).
136 468 U.S. at 452.
137 Id.
138 Id. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the conviction but reversed the death
sentence because, in considering the sentence, the trial judge relied on a confidential presentence
investigation report that had not been disclosed to the defense. See Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349
(1977). On remand, the death penalty was imposed a second time and the Supreme Court of Florida
affirmed. Id. at 452-53.
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In deciding the issue in Spaziano, the Court did not focus on these
particular circumstances but instead considered the broad question of
whether "the capital sentencing decision is one that, in all cases, should
be made by a jury."'' 3 9 After considering the general characteristics of
capital sentencing,1 40 the Court held that a capital defendant does not
have a constitutional right to jury trial at the penalty phase of a capital
trial.' 4 ' Its basis for this holding was that the judge, as well as a jury, is
able to fulfill the constitutional obligation of "evaluat[ing] the unique cir-
cumstances of the individual defendant"'142 so as to impose sentence.
In supporting this position, the Court focused on the difference be-
tween sentencing and adjudicating guilt. Citing Williams v. New York,' 43 a
capital case decided in 1949, it emphasized that "despite its unique as-
pects, a capital sentencing proceeding involves the same fundamental is-
sue involved in any other sentencing proceeding-a determination of the
appropriate punishment to be imposed on an individual." 44 Thus, the
Court's refusal to add the right to jury trial to the procedural protections
afforded a capital defendant1 45 seemed to be based on the notion that the
kind of determination that takes place at the penalty stage under Flor-
ida's capital sentencing scheme is fundamentally different from the type
of determination that takes place at the guilt stage of a criminal trial.' 46
Although the Florida sentencing judge is not permitted to impose a
death sentence without making certain factual determinations, 47 the
Court did not focus on this aspect of Florida's sentencing procedure. 4
Instead, it treated the case as one in which the judge determined whether
a death sentence would be imposed primarily on the basis of his assess-
ment of the individual characteristics of the particular offender.
In Hildwin v. Florida,149 a per curiam decision decided without brief-
ing, argument, or plenary consideration, the Court seemed to read Spazi-
ano broadly by stating that "the existence of an aggravating factor [under
Florida's capital sentencing statute] . . .is not an element of the offense
but instead is 'a sentencing factor that comes into play only after the de-
139 468 U.S. at 458. The brief filed on behalf of Spaziano argued that "a trial judge's override of
a jury's factually based decision against the death penalty must, in all cases, violate the Fifth, Sixth,
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments." Brief for Petitioner at 20. Thus, the parties did not direct
the Court to the question of whether the defendant had the right to a jury trial as to the presence or
absence of one or more of the statutorily defined aggravating circumstances.
140 468 U.S. at 458-65. In rendering its decision, the Court did not refer either to the specific
provisions of the Florida statute or the particular facts in the case before it. Instead, it focused
entirely on the general characteristics of capital sentencing.
141 Id. at 465.
142 Id. at 459 (citing Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203 (1984)).
143 337 U.S. 241 (1949) (cited at 468 U.S. at 459).
144 468 U.S. at 459.
145 Id. at 458-59. Prior to Spaziano, the Court had decided a series of cases holding that proce-
dural protections at the guilt stage are also applicable at the penalty stage. See, e.g., Estelle v. Smith,
451 U.S. 454 (1981) (privilege against self-incrimination and right to counsel under .1Iassiah); Bull-
ington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430 (1981) (double jeopardy); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977)
(right to confront and rebut government evidence). See generally Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983
SuP. CT. REv. 305, 338 [hereinafter Weisberg].
146 468 U.S. at 459.
147 Id. at 466. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(3) (1983).
148 See supra text accompanying notes 130-133.
14§ 109 S. Ct. 2055 (1989).
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fendant has been found guilty.' "150 In Hildwin, the issue before the
Court was whether the Florida capital sentencing scheme "violates the
Sixth Amendment because it permits the imposition of death without a
specific finding by the jury that sufficient aggravating circumstances exist
to qualify the defendant for capital punishment."' 5'1 In that case, the jury
returned an advisory verdict of death and the judge imposed a death sen-
tence after specifically finding four aggravating circumstances, including
two that related exclusively to the character of the defendant rather than
the circumstances of the offense. 15 2 The Court in Hildwin did not pur-
port to go beyond Spaziano.' 53 Moreover, the Court in Hildwin could not
address the issue that is the subject of this Article. In Hildwin the jury
recommended death. Under the Florida statute, the jury could not have
recommended death unless it found one or more statutory aggravating
circumstances sufficient to call for the death penalty. Therefore, Hildwin
could not address the issue of the constitutionality of a death sentence
without a jury finding of the aggravating circumstance that made the de-
fendant eligible for the death penalty.
McMillan v. Pennsylvania,'5 4 on the other hand, involved a situation
in which an enhanced sentence was triggered entirely by a specific find-
ing of fact. In McMillan the defendants each had been convicted of an
enumerated felony under Pennsylvania's Mandatory Minimum Sentenc-
ing Act which carried a maximum sentence of twenty years in prison.
The Commonwealth sought to have the defendants sentenced under the
Act, which provides that anyone convicted of a felony will be given a
mandatory minimum of five years imprisonment if the judge finds by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant "visibly possessed a
firearm" during the commission of the offense. 155 The defendants
claimed that "visible possession of a firearm" was an element of the of-
fense, requiring both a jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court found the Act constitutional and over-
turned the trial courts, which had found otherwise and sentenced de-
fendants to less than the mandatory minimum penalty.
The Court held that the case was controlled by Patterson. It focused
first on the specific provisions of the Pennsylvania statute: "[T]he Penn-
sylvania Legislature has expressly provided that visible possession of a
150 Id. at 2057 (quoting McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 86 (1986)).
151 Id. at 2056.
152 Id (The four aggravating circumstances found to exist were as follows: -[T]he [defendant]
had previous convictions for violent felonies, he was under a sentence of imprisonment at the time of
the murder, the killing was committed for pecuniary gain, and the killing was especially heinous,
atrocious, and cruel.").
153 The Court's per curam opinion itself recognized the narrowness of the issue presented. It
held:
If the Sixth Amendment permits a judge to impose a sentence of death when the jury rec-
ommends life imprisonment .... it follows that it does not forbid the judge from making the
written findings that authorize imposition of a death sentence when the jury unanimously recom-
mends a death sentence.
Id. at 2056 (emphasis added). This language says explicitly that the Hildwin jury's death verdict
makes Hildwin follow afortiori from Spaziano.
154 477 U.S. 79 (1986).
155 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9712 (1982).
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firearm is not an element of the crimes enumerated in the mandatory
sentencing statute .... but instead is a sentencing factor that comes into
play only after the defendant ,has been found guilty of one of those
crimes beyond a reasonable doubt."1 56 Acknowledging that Patterson
does impose some constitutional limit on the government's power to
base an increased sentence on factors that could have been defined as
elements of a criminal offense, the Court concluded that this limit was
not transgressed in McMillan.
The Court justified this conclusion primarily on the basis of two fac-
tors. First, it emphasized that in contrast to the situation in Specht v. Pat-
terson 157 or Mullaney v. Wilbur, 158 the stakes for the defendant were quite
minimal: "[The Pennsylvania statute] neither alters the maximum pen-
alty for the crime committed nor creates a separate offense calling for a
separate penalty; it operates solely to limit the sentencing court's discre-
tion in selecting a penalty within the range already available to it without
the special finding of visible possession of a firearm."' 59 In addition, the
Court observed that "the specter . . . of States restructuring existing
crimes in order to 'evade' the commands of Winship just does not appear
in this case" because, in passing its Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Act,
"[t]he Pennsylvania Legislature did not change the definition of any ex-
isting offense."1 60
156 477 U.S. at 85-86.
157 386 U.S. 605 (1967). Specht held that when conviction under an indecent liberties statute
invoked sentencing under a separate sex offenders act, a new charge was created, entitling the de-
fendant to procedural safeguards, including the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses and present
evidence.
158 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
159 477 U.S. at 87-88.
160 Id. at 89. This part of the Court's analysis suggests that the constitutionality of a sentencing
statute may depend on the statute's legislative history. If the sentencing statute to be applied by a
judge includes factors that were formerly elements ofan offense to be determined by a jury, then the
purpose of the restructuring may be called into question. Cf Field v. Sheriff of Wake County, 654 F.
Supp. 1367, 1374 (D. N.C. 1986) (distinguishing McMillan from sentencing provision of North Caro-
lina's driving while impaired statute in part on the ground that the North Carolina sentencing provi-
sions did not previously exist in essentially their present form long prior to the statute's enactment).
Based on this analysis, the Arizona capital sentencing statute may be suspect. Prior to Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), Arizona, like every other state, vested sentencing power in capital
cases exclusively with the jury. See ARiZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-451 to 13-456 (1956). See generally
McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 200 n.1 1 (1971). Aggravating circumstances (in Arizona and
elsewhere) were a legislative response to Furnman's requirement that capital sentencing discretion be
channeled; they perform the channeling function by narrowing the class of death-eligible offenders
through the requirement that certain facts be found as the precondition ofa.death sentence. Indeed,
since Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983), the constitutional process of imposing a death sentence
has been recognized as having two stages: the "definitional stage" of determining the defendant's
eligibility for a death sentence and the individualized sentencing stage which is reached only if the
defendant is found death-eligible. At the definitional stage, which, as in Arizona, is generally predi-
cated on the finding of one or more aggravating circumstances, there must be a meaningful "narrow-
ing" of the class of offenders to a smaller subclass to be considered for a possible death sentence.
See Maynard v. Cartwright, 108 S. Ct. 1853, 1859 (1988); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428-29
(1980). See generally Weisberg, supra note 145, at 347-54. That stage thus involves a determination
whose purpose and effect are closely akin to the historic purpose and effect of determining whether a
defendant is guilty of first-degree murder or of a lesser degree of homicide; and the findings of
"aggravating circumstances" have the same purpose and effect as the traditional findings of the
elements of first-degree murder. It is only at the subsequent stage-the stage of the individualized
sentencing determination-that the jury (or a judge) embarks on the very different kind of process
that the Court in Spaziano described as making "a determination of the appropriate punishment to be
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After stating that these differences between the present case and
Mullaney and Specht were "controlling," the Court observed that its "in-
ability to lay down any 'bright line' test may leave the constitutionality of
statutes more like those in Mullaney and Specht than is the Pennsylvania
statute to depend on differences of degree, but the law is full of situa-
tions in which differences of degree produce different results."' 6'
Based on the Court's analysis in these cases, it would appear that a
criminal defendant does have a right to jury trial as to facts that are ele-
ments of a criminal offense. Moreover, Spaziano holds that a capital de-
fendant has no right to a jury trial as to his sentence but does not
determine the circumstances under which a defendant will have a right to
jury trial as to facts that lead to an enhanced sentence.
McMillan, which deals with the latter question, holds that a defend-
ant has no absolute right to ajury trial as to facts that trigger a minimum
mandatory sentence but takes pains to limit its holding to the particular
facts in that case. Based on McMilan's analysis, the scope of a defend-
ant's constitutional right to jury trial as to facts that trigger an enhanced
sentence appears to depend on various factors, including the magnitude
of the sentence enhancement and the sentencing provision's legislative
history.
IV. A Capital Defendant's Right to Jury Fact-finding
A. A Proposed Test
In constructing a constitutional role for the jury, the established
boundaries-supported by history as well as current Supreme Court au-
thority-are that the defendant has a right to jury trial as to facts that are
elements of a criminal offense but not as to sentencing. Nevertheless, as
McMillan implies, some limits must be placed on the legislature's author-
ity to redefine elements of an offense as factors to be considered only at
sentencing. Otherwise, by restructuring crimes so that facts that tradi-
tionally lead to enhanced criminal liability are changed to sentencing fac-
tors, the legislature could eliminate the defendant's right to a jury
determination as to any facts beyond the minimum necessary to establish
criminal liability. The crime of homicide, for example, could be rede-
fined as unlawfully killing another, with the mental elements, such as
malice or recklessness, that are traditionally necessary to establish mur-
der or voluntary manslaughter changed into sentencing factors to be de-
termined by the judge.
If the constitutional right to jury trial is to be interpreted with a re-
gard for the historical concerns that gave rise to its adoption, then the
legislature's authority to define facts as sentencing factors rather than
elements of an offense should be affected by the historical evolution of
the eighteenth-century jury's role in fact-finding. On the one hand, the
allocation of fact-finding responsibility between the Crown and jury in
imposed on an individual." 468 U.S. 447, 459 (1984). In view of this legislative history, there is a
solid basis for viewing all aggravating circumstances in capital sentencing statutes as elements of a
new offense.
161 477 U.S. at 91.
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eighteenth-century English homicide cases may be considered the consti-
tutional norm; on the other hand, the jury's limited fact-finding role in
eighteenth-century seditious libel cases-which was repudiated well
before the passage of the Bill of Rights' 62-should be viewed as
unconstitutional.
In the seditious libel cases, the jury's responsibility was limited to
determining whether the defendant intentionally published the writing
and whether it bore the meaning alleged by the prosecution. The critical
questions of whether the writing was published with criminal intent and
whether it was seditious or defamatory were left to the judge.1 63 If this
allocation of fact-finding authority is viewed as the paradigm of unconsti-
tutionality, how far does the principle established by this example ex-
tend? In other words, which aspects of the jury's role in seditious libel
cases should be viewed as not constitutionally permissible?
Eighteenth-century commentators attacked the jury's limited role in
seditious libel cases on two grounds: First, the jury's traditional role was
usurped because they were not permitted to determine all of the facts
alleged in the indictment or information;1 64 second, this allocation of
fact-finding responsibility was improper because it removed from the
jury the question of the defendant's criminal intent or mens rea, a fact
which was an important element of the crime. 165
To some extent, these two attacks are interconnected. The obvious
basis for concluding that the defendant's criminal intent was an impor-
tant element of the crime of seditious libel was that the intent was alleged
in the indictment or information. 166 Nevertheless, it is important to de-
termine whether the commentators' second objection transcends their
162 See supra text accompanying notes 75-105. The views expressed in support of Fox's Libel Act
were essentially a recapitulation of views that had come to be accepted over the previous half cen-
tury. See generally GREEN II, supra note 35, at 319-31; 10 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAv 673 (5th ed. rev. 1942).
163 See supra text accompanying note 72.
164 As Lord Erskine said in 1784,
[W]hen a bill of indictment is found, or an information filed, charging any crime or misde-
meanor known to the law of England, and the party accused puts himself upon the country
by pleading the general issue,-Not Guilty; the jury are generally charged with his deliver-
ance from that cime, and not specially from the fact or facts, in the commission of which the
indictment or information charges the crime to consist; much less from any single fact, to
the exclusion of others charged upon the same record.
The Dean of St. Asaph's Case, 21 Howell's State Trials 847, 972 (1784).
165 In his same speech, Lord Erskine said,
[N]o act, which the law in its general theory holds to be criminal, constitutes in itself a
crime, abstracted from the mischievous intention of the actor; and that the intention, even
when it becomes a simple inference of legal reason from a fact or facts established, may and
ought to be collected by the jury, with the judge's assistance; because the act charged
though established as a fact in a trial on the general issue, does not necessarily and unavoidably
establish the criminal intention by any ABSTRACT conclusion of law.
Id.
166 The Trial of Mr.John Stockdale, 22 Howell's State Trials 237 (1789), provides an illustration
of this point. Stockdale was a bookseller charged with "unlawfully, wickedly and maliciously . ..
intending to ... vilify the Commons of Great Britain." Id. at 254. Lord Erskine insisted that the
charge, as worded, meant that if the jury were "firmly persuaded of the singleness and purity of the
author's intentions," they must acquit. Id. at 281. The opposing view was, of course, that publica-
tion alone, regardless of intent, was the criminal act and that the language of the information was
only retained as an "ancient form[ ] of. . .legal proceedings ...." Id. at 298. The argument
continued that "it hath, in all times, been the duty ofjudges, when they come to the proof, to sepa-
[Vol. 65:1!
CAPITAL DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL
first. If the only objection to the jury's role in seditious libel cases was
that the jury was not required to find facts alleged in the indictment or
information, then a capital defendant's right to a jury determination of
facts would depend on the nature of a state's charging process. If in
capital cases the state's indictment or information were required to set
out all of the facts that must be proved to establish the defendant's eligi-
bility for a capital sentence, 6 7 then the defendant would have the right
to ajury trial as to all those facts. On the other hand, if the state's charg-
ing process were structured so that the indictment or information only
set out the facts to be proved at the guilt phase of a capital case, with no
new pleadings required at the penalty phase, then the defendant would
have no right to jury trial as to facts that the prosecution was required to
prove at the penalty phase.168
In fact, the eighteenth-century commentators' attack on the jury's
role in libel cases focused more on the nature of the facts at issue than
they did on the facts' inclusion in the libel indictments or informations.
Lord Camden, for example, maintained throughout his professional life
that "in all crimes the criminal intent, the mens rea, was of the essence of
the crime, and must be left to and found by the jury as a matter of
fact."' 169 Similarly, Lord Erskine argued that "no act, which the law in its
general theory holds to be criminal, constitutes in itself a crime, ab-
stracted from the mischievous intention of the actor."' 170 These state-
ments indicate that the defendant's criminal intent would be considered
an element of the crime of libel without regard to the common law plead-
ing requirements.
rate the substance of the crime from the formality with which it is attended... and to confine the
proof to the substance." Id.
167 Apparently, no state requires this. In general, the indictment or information need only allege
the facts necessary to establish the highest crime with which the defendant is charged. Thus, if an
Arizona defendant is charged with the capital crime of first-degree murder, see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-1105 (1978), the indictment need only allege the facts necessary to establish the crime of first-
degree murder. If the defendant is convicted of first-degree murder, the case then proceeds to the
penalty stage at which additional evidence not alleged in the charging document may be presented.
168 See supra note 155.
169 10 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 681 (7th ed. rev. 1956). Holdsworth cites
several examples to illustrate Lord Camden's consistency. In 1752, during the trial of William
Owen, Camden (appearing for the defense as Charles Pratt) argued that, as in homicide, intent was
an integral part of the crime ofseditious libel. He maintained that ifa man kills "and the intention is
not proved, that is, if it is not proved that he killed premeditatedly and of forethought, it is but
manslaughter. Therefore, in the case before us, if that part of the information is not proved, that he
published maliciously.., you must acquit him." 18 Howell's State Trials 1203, 1227 (1752).
Similarly, Camden took issue with Lord Mansfield's jury instructions in The Trial ofJohn Miller,
20 Howell's State Trials 870, 893 (1769) and The Case of H. S. Woodfall, 20 Howell's State Trials
895, 901 (1770), challenging the judge to answer an extensive set of interrogatories on the subject.
More than two decades later, when Camden was near the end of his tenure in the House of
Lords, he took part in the debate over Fox's Libel Bill, saying,
What was the ruling principle? The intention of the party. Who were judges of the
intention of the party; the judge? No; the jury. So that the jury were allowed to judge 'f
the intention upon an indictment for murder, and not to judge of the intention of the party
upon libel. This, ihdeed, was so much out ofall principle ofjustice and common sense, that
it could not be supported for a single moment.
10 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 674-81 (7th ed. rev. 1956).
170 Id. at 681.
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Interpreted narrowly, the statements by Camdefh and Erskine could
mean that a jury determination as to mens rea (or criminal intention) was
required in libel cases only because a finding of only mens rea was neces-
sary to establish the defendant's guilt as to any criminal offense. But, as I
have already indicated, 171 their attack on the jury's role was premised on
the broader argument that the jury's fact-finding authority should be the
same in libel cases as it was in homicide cases. Camden and others ar-
gued that, just as the jury must be permitted to determine the defend-
ant's intention in murder cases, they must also be permitted "to judge of
the intention of the party upon libel."' 72 Under this view, the jury's fact-
finding authority extends not merely to determining whether the defend-
ant has the minimum mental state necessary to constitute any criminal
offense but also to whether he has the mental state required to establish
the particular offense with which he is charged.
Adopting this perspective provides a useful framework of analysis; it
does not, of course, delineate the scope of the jury's fact-finding author-
ity. Assuming the jury's limited role in seditious libel cases was rejected
on the basis stated above, at least two additional questions will be rele-
vant in defining the constitutional fact-finding authority of the modem
criminal jury. First, what types of factual determinations should be
placed in the same category as the determination of a criminal defend-
ant's mental state? Second, when do findings of fact lead to the convic-
tion of a new offense as opposed to mere sentence enhancement?
The eighteenth-century commentators' emphasis on criminal de-
fendants' right to have a jury determination as to their mental state did
not imply that defendants did not have a right to a jury determination as
to the other elements of the crime. On the contrary, Camden and Er-
skine were commenting on situations in which it was established beyond
question that the jury would determine whether the defendant did the
acts necessary to establish the criminal offense. In libel cases, the jury
did decide whether the defendant published the words in question and
whether they bore the meaning alleged by the prosecution.173 Similarly,
in murder cases, the jury did determine whether the defendant killed the
victim. The commentators' central point was that the jury must be al-
lowed to determine whether a criminal defendant has the requisite
mental state as well as whether he committed the acts necessary to consti-
tute the offense.
Thus, one principle that may be extracted from the libel law only
controversy is that in criminal cases the jury's fact-finding authority must
extend to all facts that constitute elements of the criminal offense. Estab-
lishing that the jury must be allowed to find these facts still leaves open
the question of how to determine which facts are elements of a criminal
offense, however. As I have indicated, 174 the historical antecedents of
the right to jury trial suggest that the offense should not be defined solely
171 See supra text accompanying note 83.
172 10 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 681 (7th ed. rev. 1956).
173 See stpia text accompanying note 79.
174 See supra text accompanying notes 160-66.
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on the basis of the facts required to be alleged in the charging document.
If this view is accepted, then the structure of the statute defining the
crime will not in itself be decisive. In at least some cases, whether a fact
will constitute an element of an offense will have to be made on some
other basis.
One approach would be to hold that facts relating to the circum-
stances of the offense that lead to an enhanced sentence are by definition
elements of a new offense.1 75 If, for example, a finding that a defendant
convicted of robbery used a gun in the commission of the robbery leads
to an enhanced sentence, then the fact that the defendant used a gun in
the commission of a robbery would be an element of the new offense of
committing robbery with a gun.. The Court rejected. this approach in Mc-
Millan, however. In that case, the finding that the defendant "visibly pos-
sessed a firearm" during the commission of the offense did lead to an
enhanced sentence. 176 The Court nevertheless held that no jury deter-
mination as to the facts precipitating the sentence enhancement was re-
quired. McMillan's holding can be reconciled with the jury's authority to
determine the facts that constitute a criminal offense only if the crime of
committing a felony with the visible possession of a weapon is not viewed
as a new offense.
Another approach, which I favor, is to hold that facts that lead to an
enhanced sentence but need not be alleged in the charging instrument
1 77
are nevertheless elements of a new offense if two conditions are met:
first, the facts relate to the circumstances of the crime rather than the
character of the offender; second, proof of the facts leads to a signifi-
cantly enhanced sentence, when measured either by the actual punish-
ment imposed or the stigma that attaches to the enhanced sentence.
This approach seems consistent with the framers' probable view of
the jury's fact-finding role. In eighteenth-century jury trials, the norm
was for the jury to determine the facts relating to the circumstances of
the offense that had a bearing on the defendant's criminal liability, in-
cluding any facts that would magnify the degree of the offense. In prac-
tice, however, facts that magnified the degree of the offense did lead to a
significantly enhanced sentence, when measured by either the actual
punishment imposed or the stigma that attached to the conviction. In
homicide cases, for example, the jury would decide whether the defend-
ant was guilty of manslaughter or murder, two offenses that carried both
significantly different punishments1 78 and markedly different stigmas.
79
175 Prior to McMillan, a number of lower courts adopted this approach. See, e.g., State v. Wedge,
293 Or. 598, 652 P.2d 773 (1982); State v. Nass, 456 P.2d 347 (Wash. 1969).
176 477 U.S. 79, 81 (1986). See also text accompanying note 154.
177 Based on the Court's analysis in Patterson, it seems clear that facts that must be alleged in the
charging instrument are by definition elements of the offense. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S.
197, 210 (1977). See also supra text accompanying note 132.
178 By the eighteenth century, murder, the intentional killing with malice aforethought, was no
longer protected by the benefit of clergy. Instead, it was punishable by death. Manslaughter, how-
ever, remained within that protection. If convicted, a defendant was not put to death, but had his
hand branded, ensuring that he would be permanently identified as a criminal. See 4 W. BLACK-
STONE, COMMENTARIES *191-93.
179 A person convicted of murder almost invariably forfeited his land and chattels to the King. A
person convicted of manslaughter would not ordinarily suffer this penalty unless special circum-
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The focus upon whether the facts related to the circumstances of the
offense rather than the character of the offender also corresponds with
the jury's historical role. The first jurors were selected because of their
special knowledge of crimes committed. °80 Thus, these jurors' fact-find-
ing authority naturally extended to all of the circumstances of the crime.
Moreover, in felony cases it soon became established that, whereas juries
would determine the facts pertaining to the crime, judges would decide
whether the defendant was eligible for benefit of clergy, a decision re-
quiring a factual determination relating to the defendant's personal char-
acteristics. 18' Thus, the dichotomy between facts relating to the offense
and those relating to the offender was established long before the jury's
authority to determine the former type of facts developed in the course
of the controversy surrounding the seditious libel cases.'
8 2
The proposed test is also consistent with modern Supreme Court
authority. In Specht v. Patterson,18 3 the Court held that a defendant is enti-
tled to constitutional safeguards at sentencing when enhanced sentenc-
ing (in that case an increase of the maximum sentence from ten years to
life imprisonment) is based on "a new finding of fact ... that was not an
ingredient of the offense charged." 8 4 In Specht, the right to jury trial was
not included within these constitutional safeguards because the Court
had not yet held that the right to jury trial applies to the states through
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Specht, together
with Duncan v. Louisiana,'85 seems to establish that the defendant has a
right to jury trial at sentencing as to facts that are an element of a new
offense.
In McMillan, the Court held that the defendant does not have the
right to jury trial as to all facts relating to the circumstances of the of-
fense that lead to enhanced sentencing. 8 6 In so holding, the Court em-
phasized that the enhanced sentence resulting from the finding of fact in
that case was relatively insignificant' 8 7 in comparison to the sentence en-
hancements involved in the cases of Specht or Mullaney v. Wilbur. 188 Thus,
the Court left open the question of whether a defendant will have the
right to a jury determination as to a fact relating to the circumstances of
the offense that leads to a substantial sentence enhancement.
The Court's decision in Spaziano suggests that the jury's role in fact-
finding will also be affected by whether the fact to be decided relates to
the circumstances of the offense as opposed to the character of the of-
stances were present. See 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HIs'roRY OF ENGLISH LAW 465-66 (2d
ed. 1898).
180 See surpa text accompanying notes 76-108.
181 See supra note 54.
182 See supra text accompanying notes 76-108.
183 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
184 Id. at 608.
185 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
186 See 477 U.S. 79, 84 (1986).
187 Id. at 87-88, 89.
188 421 U.S. 684 (1975). The sentence differential was between mandatory life imprisonment for
conviction of murder (ME REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2651 (1964)) and a variable range of penalties,
from a nominal fine up to a maximum of twenty years imprisonment, for conviction of manslaughter
(ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2551 (1964)). 421 U.S. at 686 n.3, 700.
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fender. In Spaziano, the Court's decision that jury sentencing was not
required at the Florida penalty stage was based on its conclusion that this
sentencing proceeding "involves the same fundamental issue involved in
any other sentencing proceeding-a determination of the appropriate
punishment to be imposed on an individual."1 89 Although Florida's sen-
tencing statute does require the sentencing judge to make findings on
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, 190 the Court did not appear to
regard this aspect of the Florida sentencing procedure as part of the is-
sue before it.91 Moreover, the death penalty before the Court in Spazi-
ano could have been predicated on a finding that pertained to the
characteristics of the defendant rather than the circumstances of the of-
fenge.192 Thus, the Court's holding that a capital defendant is not consti-
tutionally entitled to jury sentencing seemed to be premised on the
conclusion that capital sentencing essentially involves a "largely moral
judgment of the defendant's desert"' 93 rather than a determination of
facts that pertain to the circumstances of the offense.
B. Applying the Test to the Adamson Case
Applying the test to the situation presented in Adamson indicates that
the Ninth Circuit's holding was correct. Since Adamson's eligibility for
the death penalty was determined on the basis of factual determinations
relating to his mental state at the time he committed the offense, the first
prong of the test is met. Under the Arizona statute, the defendant could
not be sentenced to death unless at least one aggravating circumstance
was found to exist. 194 In Adamson's case, the two aggravating circum-
stances that were found to exist related to his motive for committing the
murder' 95 and his mental state at the time he committed it.196 Just as
earlier capital defendants became eligible for capital punishment because
it was determined that they killed with malice (i.e., killing intentionally
without provocation)' 97 or with premeditation, 98 Adamson became eli-
189 468 U.S. 447, 459 (1984).
190 FLA. STAT. §§ 921.141(2)(b), 921.141(3)(b) (1983), 477 U.S. at 451 n.4.
191 In fact, the Court observed that the defendant did not "urge that capital sentencing is so
much like a trial on guilt or innocence that it is controlled by the Court's decision in Duncan v.
Louisiana." 468 U.S. at 458.
192 The first of the two aggravating circumstances found to exist in Spaziano-that the defendant
had prior felony convictions-related to the character of the offender rather than the circumstances
of the offense. Based on the Court's decision in Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939 (1983), a Florida
death penalty will be constitutional if the sentencer determines that at least one valid aggravating
circumstance is present even though one of the other aggravating circumstances weighed against the
mitigating circumstances is invalid. See generally Weisberg, supra note 145, at 354-58. Therefore, in
Spaziano it would be unnecessary to determine whether the second aggravating circumstance-relat-
ing to whether the crime was heinous or atrocious-was invalid because it was determined to exist by
ajudge rather than a jury; under Barclay, the death penalty could stand on the basis of the aggravat-
ing circumstance that related only to the character of the offender and therefore, under my proposed
test, could be found to exist by a judge.
193 Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 341 n.7 (1984).
194 ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(e) (1978).
195 See supra text accompanying note 4.
196 See supra text accompanying note 5.
197 "[T]he killing must be committed with malice aforethought to make it the crime of murder. This
is the grand criterion which now distinguishes murder from other killing." 4 W. BLACKSTONE, CONI-
MENTARIES * 198-99.
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gible for capital punishment because it was determined either that he
killed with a motive of "pecuniary gain" or that he killed in an "especially
heinous, cruel or depraved" manner.
The second prong of the test is also easily met. A finding that one of
the aggravating circumstances exists enhances the defendant's potential
sentence from twenty-five years to execution.1 99 In view of the Court's
repeated statements that the sentence of death is qualitatively different
from a sentence of any term of imprisonment,200 it is scarcely necessary
to argue that this increase constitutes a significantly enhanced sentence.
As a punishment, death is immeasurably more serious than any lesser
punishment.
V. Conclusion
In addition to being consistent with both the modern Supreme
Court cases and the historical concerns that give meaning to the right to
jury trial, the proposed test has at least two practical advantages. First,
while maintaining the criminal defendant's coie right to jury fact-finding,
it provides the state and federal governments with substantial freedom to
minimize the jury's role in sentencing. Moreover, as the test's applica-
tion to Adamson illustrates, the test will be likely to yield predictable re-
sults at least in capital cases.
Under the proposed test, legislators may eliminate the jury's role in
sentencing by simply altering the nature of the facts that lead to en-
hanced sentencing. The Federal Dangerous Special Offender statute20'
provides an apt example. Under that statute, a defendant convicted of a
federal felony202 may be sentenced as a dangerous special offender if the
judge finds that the defendant is both a "special offender" within the
meaning of section 3575(e)(1) and "dangerous" within the meaning of
section 3575(0. The former finding depends upon whether the defend-
ant has previously been convicted of other felonies 20 3 and the latter upon
whether the judge determines that "a period of confinement longer than
that provided for [the defendant's current felony conviction] is required
for the protection of the public from further criminal conduct by the de-
fendant." 20 4 Although these findings could lead to significantly en-
198 "Express malice is when one, with a sedate deliberate mind and formed design, doth kill
another...." Id. at 198. See generall 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 314 (5th ed.
rev. 1942); 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, TIlE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 468-69 (2d ed. 1898).
199 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(E) (1978).
200 See, e.g., Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 294 (1982) ("[rlhe death penalty is different from
other punishments in kind rather than degree."); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357 (1976)
("[Flive Members of the Court have now expressly recognized that death is a different kind of pun-
ishment from any other which may be imposed in this country."); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428
U.S. 280, 305 (1975) ("[T]he penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of imprison-
ment, however long. Death, in its finality, differs more from life imprisonment than a 100-year
prison term differs from one of only a year or two.").
201 18 U.S.C. § 3575 (1982).
202 Id. at § 3575(b).
203 A defendant may be determined to be a dangerous special offender if she has previously been
convicted of two or more separate felonies punishable by death or imprisonment for more than one
year, and if fewer than five years have elapsed between the commission of the present felony and
commission of or release from prison for a previous conviction. Id. at § 3575(e)(1).
204 Id. at § 3575(f).
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hanced punishment, 20 5 under the proposed test, the defendant would
not have a right to a jury determination of the pertinent facts because
those facts do not pertain to the circumstances of the defendant's current
offense.206
Applying the test in capital cases will generally be easy. In all of the
states that provide for judicial sentencing at the penalty trial, the judge
may not impose a death sentence unless she finds that one or more statu-
torily specified aggravating circumstances exist. 207 Since the conse-
quences of the death penalty are clearly more significant than any lesser
penalty, 20 8 the defendant's right to jury trial depends on whether the
particular aggravating circumstance that justifies the death penalty re-
lates to the circumstances of the offense rather than the character of the
offender. 20 9 In most instances, distinguishing between aggravating cir-
cumstances that relate to the former as opposed to the latter is not diffi-
cult. A finding that the murder was perpetrated by torture, 210 for
example, must be made by the jury because it relates to the circum-
stances of the crime; a determination that the defendant was previously
convicted of a felony,2 1' on the other hand, may be made by the judge
because it relates exclusively to the character of the offender.
Although the test may yield predictable results, in a certain sense it
seems arbitrary to have a capital defendant's right to a jury turn on the
nature of the fact to be decided. Why should the defendant have the
right to a jury trial when his eligibility for the death penalty depends on
whether the crime was particularly heinous, for example, but not have
that right when his eligibility depends on whether he will be a future
danger to society? Both of these determinations involve difficult subjec-
tive judgments that relate to the sentencer's assessment of the defendant
and each determination will lead to the same consequences.
Moreover, the context in which the capital sentencing decision is
made compounds the sense that the distinction being drawn is somewhat
205 If the defendant is shown by a preponderance of the evidence to be a dangerous special of-
fender, the court can impose a sentence of up to twenty-five years imprisonment. Id. at § 3575(b).
The statute does not prevent the additional imposition of the death sentence, life imprisonment or a
term exceeding twenty-five years if any of those are applicable. Id. at § 3575(c).
206 The lower courts that have considered the issue are generally in accord with this result. See,
e.g., United States v. Schell, 692 F.2d 672, 677 (10th Cir. 1982); United States v. Bowdach, 561 F.2d
1160, 1172 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Stewart, 531 F.2d 326, 332 (6th Cir. 1976); United
States v. Williamson, 567 F.2d 610, 615 (4th Cir. 1977). But see United States v. Duardi, 384 F. Supp.
874, 883 (W.D. Mo., 1974). See generally Note, The Constitutionalitv of Statutes Permitting Increased
Sentences for Habitual or Dangerous Crimnals, 89 HARV. L. REV. 356 (1975).
207 See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-305 (1987) (The court "shall impose a sentence of death if
it finds one or more of the aggravating circumstances and finds that there are no mitigating circum-
stances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency."); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2522(1) (1985) ("[T]he
judge.., shall fix the sentence at either death or life imprisonment, but such determination shall be
based upon . . . [w]hether sufficient aggravating circumstances exist to justify imposition of a sen-
tence of death .... ).
208 See supra note 197.
209 See supra text accompanying note 162.
210 See, e.g., ARM. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(F)(6) (1978) ("[c]ommitted in an especially heinous,
cruel or depraved manner").
211 See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(F)(1) ("convicted of another offense in the United
States for which under Arizona law a sentence of life imprisonment or death was imposable [sic].").
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tenuous. As I have noted, 2 12 all aggravating circumstances-whether
they relate to the circumstances of the offense or the character of the
offender-may properly be viewed as elements of a new offense in the
sense that they have the purpose and effect of narrowing the class of
death-eligible defendants. Moreover, from a functional perspective, the
content of the specific aggravating circumstances enumerated in a sen-
tencing statute is not critical. Regardless of the specific aggravating and
mitigating circumstances to be determined, the sentencer is required to
make an essentially moral judgment as to whether the defendant should
live or die.2 13 Thus, it may be argued that the capital defendant's right to
jury trial should not vary depending on the particular aggravating cir-
cumstances to be determined.
Accepting this argument would lead to the conclusion that a capital
defendant should either have a right to jury trial at the penalty trial in all
cases or no right to jury trial at all. At present, however, Spaziano pre-
cludes the former conclusion; the latter one should be rejected because it
would eliminate an aspect of the jury's fact-finding power that has histor-
ically been an integral part of the right to jury trial.
Historically, one of the jury's most basic functions has been to deter-
mine whether a homicide defendant has committed an offense that is
subject to the death penalty. Over the centuries, the definition of a capi-
tal offense has changed, but the jury's role in determining whether the
defendant has committed that offense has remained relatively constant.
In the middle ages, when most intentional killings not committed in self-
defense were capital, the jury decided whether the defendant intention-
ally killed the victim and whether he was acting in self-defense. 214 Later,
when the definition of capital homicide depended on whether the de-
fendant acted in the heat of passion or with premeditation, the jury again
was responsible for determining whether those elements were pres-
ent.21 5 Thus, a homicide defendant's eligibility for capital punishment
has historically depended on whether the jury determined that he acted
with some particular mental state at the time of the killing. 21 6
The jury's authority to determine these facts has always been inte-
grally connected to its basic role of safeguarding a criminal defendant
from government oppression. By finding facts so as to mitigate the
harshness of the medieval law of homicide, the jury was able to bring the
application of capital punishment for homicide more nearly in line with
community perceptions relating to just deserts. 21 7 Later, it became ac-
212 See supra note 155.
213 Weisberg, supia note 145, at 306: "Ithe penalty trial ... is a curious new legal form in which
the state prosecutes a convicted murderer for the enhanced crime, or moral condition, of deserving
the death penalty." [Footnote omitted.]
214 See supra text accompanying notes 32-36.
215 See supra text accompanying notes 47-51.
216 Moreover, at least in the early homicide cases, the judge's determination as to whether a
defendant eligible for benefit of clergy would be granted benefit of clergy was analogous to the
"individualized sentencing" determination, which, under the modern system of capital punishment,
occurs only after one or more aggravating circumstances have been found to exist. In both situa-
tions, the judge orjury decides whether an individual who is eligible for capital punishment will in
fact be sentenced to death.
217 See supra text accompanying notes 37-40.
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cepted that in homicide cases the jury would exercise its nullification
power when it believed that the defendants--although they might be
technically guilty of the capital offense-did not deserve to die.2 1 8 Thus,
in this context, the jury's fact-finding power has historically been used to
temper the application of capital punishment so that it will mirror the
community's perception as to when that punishment is appropriate.
Under the present system of capital punishment, a homicide defend-
ant's eligibility for capital punishment still often depends on whether the
defendant did the killing with a particular mental state. Instead of asking
whether the killing was in the heat of passion or premeditated, the cur-
rent statutes ask such questions as whether it was especially heinous or
cruel2 19 or whether it was done for pecuniary gain.220 If the jury's fact-
finding authority includes the power to determine Wvhether a homicide
defendant has committed an offense that is subject to capital punish-
ment, then a defendant charged under the current system of capital pun-
ishment should have the right to a jury determination as to these facts.
Indeed, the justification for interpreting the defendant's right to jury
trial in this way is even stronger now than it was when the constitutional
right to jury trial was adopted. Although the jury's fact-finding power
has historically been used to mitigate the law's harshness with respect to
the application of capital punishment for homicide offenses, until re-
cently this aspect of the jury's fact-finding authority has not necessarily
been considered desirable.22' In the modern era of capital punishment,
however, the Court has explicitly recognized that in determining whether
a capital defendant will be sentenced to death the jury must "express the
conscience of the community on the ultimate question of life or
death. ' 222 In other words, the jury should adjudicate capital cases in a
way that is consistent with the community's perception as to when the
death penalty should be applied. Thus, consistent with both the historic
concerns that led to the adoption of the right to jury trial and the modem
concerns relating to the jury's role in the administration of capital pun-
ishment, a capital defendant's right to jury trial must include at least the
right to have the jury determine whether the defendant did the killing
with the mental state necessary to be eligible for capital punishment.
218 See supra text accompanying note 53.
219 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(F)(6) (1978).
220 Id. at § 13-703(F)(5).
221 For example, in Rex v. Windham, 84 Eng. Rep. 113 (1667), it was reported that, "when a
petty jury, contrary to directions of the Court, will find a murther manslaughter, albeit it lie properly
before them, yet the Court will fine them ......
222 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 301 n.36 (1975) (quoting Witherspoon v. Illinois,
391 U.S. 510, 519 (1967)).
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